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Increasingly, countries are beginning to look to their respective judiciary to be the keeper of morality and the final voice on difficult complex issues. 2 Whether dissatisfaction with the legislative process or simply a willingness on the part of the judiciary to shape the culture, advocates for socially progressive norms have repeatedly invoked the power of the courts to affect changes in the culture outside of the democratic processes. These causes are characterized by the moral dimension of their scope, and distinguished largely by the relative absence of any positive legal foundation upon which adjudication can be made. Despite this, with escalating frequency courts are being urged to decide divisive issues once for all. Now, with the appearance of A., B. and C. v. Ireland, the European Court of Human Rights is presented with the same jurisprudential problem. People often equate legality with morality. This 4 practice belies confusion of legal and moral authority; of democratic and legal force.
In the United States, the combatants of the culture wars have made considerable efforts to reshape the moral landscape through the coercive power of the courts. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
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Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrated its willingness to have the last word on the abortion debate and the majority revealed that they valued a desire to retain a position of power over a chance to reconsider the plight of the unborn, even after the United States Department of Justice repeatedly requested they do so. As a rule in democracies, legislatures are the branches 6 
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contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution. . . . But whatever the premises of opposition may be, only the most convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the first was anything but a surrender to political pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the principle on which the Court staked its authority in the first instance. So to overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question.
The country's loss of confidence in the Judiciary would be underscored by an equally certain and equally reasonable condemnation for another failing in overruling unnecessarily and under pressure. . . . The Court's duty in the present cases is clear. In 1973, it confronted the already-divisive issue of governmental power to limit personal choice to undergo abortion, for which it provided a new resolution based on the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether or not a new social consensus is developing on that issue, its divisiveness is no less today than in 1973, and pressure to overrule the decision, like pressure to retain it, has grown only more intense. A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe's original decision, and we do so today. Id. at 867-69 (emphasis added). This language seems to suggest that if the societal pressure had been absent, the court would have been free to overrule, but because people vigorously protested the decision the court could not even consider looking at the plight of the unborn. which remain most directly responsible to the people or masses. Legislators 7 often leave contentious issues to the judiciary to solve so that they can avoid taking a stand which would alienate a large number of their constituents. 8 While convenient, this raises significant concerns. United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out the absurdity in allowing the judiciary to amass such power and to decide such vitally important issues when he said in his Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health concurrence, the point at which life becomes "worthless," and the point at which the means necessary to preserve it become "extraordinary" or "inappropriate," are neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine justices of this Court any better than they are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory. 11. Ireland, if it chose to take extraordinary measures, technically could choose to withdraw from the Council of Europe rather than follow the court's ruling or refuse to abide by the ruling and risk expulsion by the Council of Europe. Ireland could also choose to withdraw from the European Union if that became necessary.
Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty explicitly makes provision for the voluntary secession of a Member State from the EU. Specifically, the exit clause provides that a Member State wishing to withdraw from the EU must inform the European Council of its intention; the Council is to produce guidelines on the basis of which a withdrawal agreement is to be negotiated with that Member State; and the Council, acting by a qualified majority and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, will conclude the agreement on behalf of the EU. The withdrawing Member State would cease to be bound by the treaties either from the date provided for in the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after notification of its intention to withdraw. Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and EMU: Some Reflections, 10 LEGAL WORKING PAPER SERIES 1, 23 (Dec. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1517760 (Although Ireland would hypothetically be allowed to leave, it would not be an easy process.). The process for voluntarily withdrawing from the Council of Europe is somewhat more straightforward. Under Article 7 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, Any member of the Council of Europe may withdraw by formally notifying the Secretary General of its intention to do so. Such withdrawal shall take effect at the end of the financial year in which it is notified, if the notification is given during the first nine months of that financial year. If the notification is given in the last three months of the financial year, it shall take effect at the end of the next financial year.
Yet on the abortion issue, most of the decisions have been left to the courts which uniformly have demonstrated a lack of sensitivity towards the unborn.
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This year, in proceedings before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), seventeen judges will have the chance to respect Ireland's domestic sovereignty and its constitutional amendment protecting unborn life or, in a step of judicial activism, essentially force Ireland to create a right to abortion. On December 9, 2009, the case was 11 2010 " under "CQ transcriptions" database). Grassley continued: "If confirmed, would you rely on or cite international foreign law when you decide cases?" Id. She added that she is "in favor of good ideas coming from wherever you can get them" and said "there are a number of circumstances" when foreign law might be appropriate. Id. Her appointment increases the chances that if an international right to abortion is found in A., B and C v. Ireland the court may use that precedent in reconsidering a case about whether indigent women have a Constitutional right to federally funded abortions. Justice Ginsburg commented in a recent interview about her belief that Roe was originally "going to be then set up for Medicaid funding for abortion" and her belief that reproductive choice needs to be straightened out so that there is not a policy which only affects poor women. Emily Bazelon, the recitation of the human stories that tug at the heartstrings and illustrate the hardships these three particular women faced in their decisions to terminate their pregnancies.
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Due to the facts' emotive appeal to the media, and indeed to the judges hearing the case, it is important to keep the facts in mind when considering the case. Interestingly, one of the three applicants in the case is not Irish. The applicants are two female Irish nationals and one female Lithuanian national who resides in Ireland. All three of the applicants in this case allege that they 17 became pregnant unintentionally, but otherwise each has a unique story to 18 tell.
The first applicant, A, was a recovering alcoholic, unmarried, unemployed, and impoverished mother of four. She had recently 19 reestablished contact with her four children who were in foster care and feared that a new sibling would endanger the reunification of her family. Therefore, 20 she made the decision to travel to England and procure an abortion there, overcoming the hurdles of insufficient funds, international travel, and doing 2010 would not assist her in a medical abortion due to the need for follow-up medical care, so C waited eight weeks in order to be eligible for a surgical abortion causing her "emotional distress and fear for her health." Upon her 35 return to Ireland, C suffered "the complications of an incomplete abortion, including prolonged bleeding and infection." After the experience, C chose 36 to sue in the ECHR.
When read together, these three stories put a face on the very real cost to women imposed by Ireland's constitutional amendment protecting unborn life. If their stories are framed in the light most favorable to their point of view-a recovering alcoholic struggling to put her life back on track to care for her four young children, a single woman alone facing a risky ectopic pregnancy, and a courageous cancer survivor battling for her life and simultaneously worrying about the damage she may have already unwittingly caused the fetus-they create a compelling tale of the struggles of Irish women unwillingly or unintentionally pregnant. will be referred to as D, E, and F. They are the three fetuses whose lives were abruptly and tragically brought to an end by A, B, and C's individual decision to procure an abortion. Ireland's Constitution mandates that their right to life be respected, considered, and balanced with the women's hardships. The 38 provision reads, " [t] he State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right." Ireland's provision struggles to balance the rights of the unborn 39 person and the mother while recognizing that the basic right to life enshrined in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights takes primacy over all other rights. Ireland's conception of the unborn considers six sympathetic individuals in the case instead of limiting its scope to only the three women. As that is a decision that widens and broadens protections and maintains the historical understanding of human life, it is a decision that should be respected. 45. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 8.1 ("Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence."); id. art. 8.2 ("There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.").
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A. The Applicants' Article 8 Claims Fail
First, the women allege that their right to privacy in all family, home, and personal interests was violated, and that Ireland's abortion ban interferes with their entitlement to freedom from public interference from any public authority in exercising this right. The women also listed in their complaint 45 that:
[T]he national law on abortion was not sufficiently clear and precise, since the Constitutional term "unborn" was vague and since the criminal prohibition was open to different interpretations. The fact that it was open to women-provided they had sufficient resources-to travel outside Ireland to have an abortion defeated the aim of the restriction and the fact that abortion was available in Ireland only in very limited circumstances was disproportionate and excessive. 46 In the Grand Chamber of the ECHR's response to this count of the complaint, the Grand Chamber reframed the claim by requesting the parties prepare arguments on whether "in the particular circumstances of each applicant's case, did the national legal position concerning abortion interfere with her rights under Article 8 of the Convention? If so, was the interference provided for by law, did it pursue a legitimate aim and was it proportionate to that aim?" I argue, based on the following paragraphs, that the Irish law is 47 proportionate to the legitimate aim. It is noteworthy that the ECHR has concluded in earlier cases that, "the protection in Ireland of the right to life of the unborn both" serve a "legitimate aim" and are proportionally tailored and necessary in a democratic society. 48 Ireland responds to the women's complaint by observing that the Article 8 guarantee is not absolute within the context of pregnancy, and that by definition pregnancy is not a wholly private matter. Indeed, the ECHR has If the ECHR should determine that Ireland's national position on abortion interfered with the women's Article 8 right, then the second question will be addressed. The Court will need to determine whether "Ireland's restriction on 2010 prohibit abortion entirely or allow it only to save the mother's life."). The 68 include four other signatories of the European Convention on Human Rights. Also, there is no internationally recognized right to abortion in existence in international law or treaty. "Pro-abortion groups cannot find an international right to abortion and so are forced to cite only non-binding, ungratified interpretations by unelected compliance committees. These carry no weight." Id. at 9.
61. An additional factor to consider is the question of which women's health counts in the calculus. Somewhat more than half of the unborn children killed in abortion are women. . . . [A]ll over the world and increasingly in Western nations, female unborn children are selected for abortion precisely because they are women and not men, in a practice that the UNFPA calls "female infanticide. The ECHR has concluded in earlier cases that the protections afforded to the unborn serve a "legitimate aim" and can be proportionally tailored and necessary in a democratic society. Even more damaging to A, B, and C's 64 claim is that Article 8 of the Convention states, [t] here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests [. . .] for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 65 This provision notes that there are recognized exceptions to Article 8. The ECHR has previously commented on its determination that the Irish protection of the unborn qualifies as a legitimate aim, and a potential exception for the protection of health and morals under Article 10, and presumably a potential exception under Article 8 which mirrors its language. The prohibition on 66 abortion also falls under the last exception as it serves to protect the rights and freedoms of the unborn who qualify as "others" under Irish law. approach is sufficiently balanced between the competing interests. The women also assert that the ban fails because it is imprecise in its language and unreasonable in accommodating women's health concerns. 70 However, by relying upon and deferring to recognized and accepted medical guidelines, the law achieves the necessary precision. Irish case law and the Irish Medical Council guidelines both recognize that termination may occur where the risk of death is both real and substantial. Relying to an extent on 71 a doctor's clinical judgment as to when a particular life is in danger is more sensible than trying to craft a legislative rule which would attempt to create universally applicable guidelines that would work in highly individual and unique situations. The ECHR has recognized that "it is not its function to 72 question the doctors' clinical judgment as regards the seriousness of the first applicant's condition or the appropriateness of the treatment they proposed." 73 Given the specific nature of the Irish law and its accompanying medical guidelines this challenge would seem to fail in the face of the evidence.
B. The Applicants' Article 3 Claim Is Without Merit
Second, the women claim that the ban on abortion violates their right to be free from inhumane and degrading treatment (Article 3) because allegedly, women seeking abortions in Ireland are stigmatized and suffer increased feelings of guilt, as well as difficulty securing follow-up care. is readily understood why the Court requested clarification of the petitioners' argument.
The necessary elements to constitute torture, inhumane, or degrading treatment have been set out in the CAT and adopted by the ECHR. The 77 elements are: the infliction of severe mental or physical pain; the intentional or deliberate infliction of pain; and the pursuit of a specific purpose such as gaining information, punishment or intimidation. The ECHR has expanded 78 the standard of inhumane or degrading treatment to ask if the treatment was "deliberately causing severe suffering, mental or physical, which in a particular situation is unjustifiable." It is telling that the ECHR found no 79 violation of Article 3 when an applicant was prevented from obtaining an abortion by Polish law even when the result was a deterioration of the woman's vision. The Court has also held "that the object of the treatment 80 complained of must have as its object, the purpose of humiliation and debasement of the applicants." It is difficult to find a rational argument that 81 the purpose of Ireland's pro-life policy is to humiliate or debase Irish women. Outside of protecting the life of the mother, abortion is an elective procedure and denial of an elective abortion should not be considered denial of essential healthcare. Pregnant women are not detained if they wish to travel abroad to 82 [T]o show that Ireland has the requisite intent to commit torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, Irish authorities would at least need to be aware that a particular woman had or is seeking an abortion. Allowing a mere omission to constitute torture or inhuman treatment would constitute a slippery slope that inalterably undermines the Convention and its purposes.
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The woman may feel humiliated or guilty, but Ireland's actions do not seek to promote or encourage her feelings of guilt and shame. Thus, its actions do not constitute degrading or inhumane torture, and so the Article 3 claim should also fail.
C. Applicant C's Article 2 Claim Also Fails
Third, the allegation is brought by C alone that the ban on abortion breaches her right to life (Article 2) because the Irish government has not provided any clear legislation about when abortion may be legally carried out under the exception reserved for saving the mother's life, which placed her In current obstetrical practice rare complications can arise where therapeutic intervention is required at a stage in pregnancy when there will be little or no prospect for the survival of the baby, due to extreme immaturity. In these exceptional situations failure to intervene may result in the death of both mother and baby. We consider that there is a fundamental difference between abortion carried out with the intention of taking the life of the baby, for example for social reasons, and the unavoidable death of the baby resulting from essential treatment to protect the life of the mother. Id. at app. C. life in danger. The ECHR inquired into whether any issue arose under 87 Article 2 during the oral arguments.
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Under Article 2 the state has a positive obligation to provide health care to an individual when it has undertaken to make a certain type of health care widely available to the population. Abortion is not provided in Ireland except 89 when the life of the mother is at stake, so Ireland has no positive obligation to provide abortion services to its citizens. The ECHR has already resolved that negative claims that government inaction would violate a petitioner's right to life cannot be considered separately from an Article 3 claim. There is clearly 90 a legislative exception built into the Irish Constitution allowing doctors to perform abortions to save the life of a mother. This exception is invoked by 91 independent medical judgment and justly recognizes that potential medical conditions are fact specific and legislation cannot (and should not) attempt to adequately address all possible scenarios. As such, the invocation of the exception is appropriately left in the hands of the medical professionals who have published guidelines on the subject. C's doctor could have performed 92 an abortion on Irish soil if he felt it was medically necessary to save her life. C had a range of options to choose from after her primary care physician declined to deem the pregnancy a risk to her life.
Most importantly for C's claim, is the reality that the ECHR has held there is no corresponding "negative" right that goes along with the Article 2 right to life. In the framework of the euthanasia situation, the ECHR has stated that Article 2 does not encompass a negative right. 14 ("The enjoyment of the of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with
The consistent emphasis in all the cases before the Court has been the obligation of the State to protect life. The Court is not persuaded that "the right to life" guaranteed in Article 2 can be interpreted as involving a negative aspect. While, for example in the context of Article 11 of the Convention, the freedom of association has been found to involve not only a right to join an association but a corresponding right not to be forced to join an association, the Court observes that the notion of a freedom implies some measure of choice as to its exercise [. . .]. Article 2 of the Convention is phrased in different terms. It is unconcerned with issues to do with the quality of living or what a person chooses to do with his or her life. To the extent that these aspects are recognised as so fundamental to the human condition that they require protection from State interference, they may be reflected in the rights guaranteed by other Articles of the Convention, or in other international human rights instruments. Article 2 cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely a right to die.
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Pursuing the argument of the Court respecting Article 2, it is clear that its language precludes the absurd result suggested by the petitioner. It would be inappropriate for the Court to minimize the protection Ireland affords the unborn. Especially considering that "Convention law does not impose rigid 94 standards for requirements for Member States on moral questions. It sets certain minimal standards for the protection of fundamental human rights and gives a wide margin of discretion to States, depending on the nature of the right, on the nature of the issues and the importance of the issues at stake, and on the existence or absence of consensus or international law on the topic." 95 This is a case where the court should apply the margin of appreciation doctrine. Ireland's treatment of women in C's situation meets the minimal standard of protection under Article 2 and as such her claim should be denied.
D. The Applicants Fail to Provide Evidence of the Discrimination Necessary for an Article 14 Claim
Fourth, the women allege that Irish abortion law discriminates on the basis of sex and financial status (Article 14 The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so. The permissibility of abortion, and the limitations upon it, are to be resolved like most important questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and then voting. As the Court acknowledges, "where reasonable people disagree the government can adopt one position or the other." Ante, 505 U.S. at 851. The Court is correct in adding the qualification that this "assumes a state of affairs in which the choice does not intrude upon a protected liberty," ibid.-but the crucial part of that qualification is the penultimate word. A State's choice between two positions on which reasonable people can disagree is constitutional even when (as is often the case) it intrudes upon a "liberty" in the absolute sense. Laws against bigamy, for example-with which entire societies of reasonable people disagree-intrude upon men and women's liberty to marry and live with one another. But bigamy happens not to be a liberty specially "protected" by the Constitution. That is, quite simply, the issue in these cases: not whether the power of a woman to abort her unborn child is a "liberty" in the absolute sense; or even whether it is a liberty of great importance to many women. Of course it is both. The issue is whether it is a liberty protected by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not. I reach that conclusion not because of anything so exalted as my views concerning the "concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Ibid. Rather, I reach it for the same reason I reach the conclusion that bigamy is not constitutionally protected-because of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed. Akron II, supra, at 520. 109 Here, Justice Scalia has aptly summarized one of this paper's main arguments. 
A. Customary International Law and State Practice Do Not Provide Grounds for Creating an International Right to Abortion
Customary international law is defined as "result[ing] from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." Comment C to Section 102 of the Restatement further explains 116 that, "[f]or a practice of states to become a rule of customary international law it must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris sive necessitatis); a practice that is generally followed but which states feel legally free to disregard does not contribute customary law." Brierly further elucidates the standards by stating that: 117 Custom in its legal sense means something more than mere habit or usage; it is a usage felt by those who follow it to be an obligatory one. There must be present a feeling that, if the usage is departed from, some form of sanction probably, or at any rate ought to, fall on the transgressor. nations, only 56 nations allow abortion without restriction as to the reason.
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This falls short of establishing customary international law. Despite the requirement for custom to be the consistent and general practice of states, courts often look to history and cite it as custom mandating a certain resolution of the issue. Although the presentation of the history in Roe would cause readers to believe that there had been no historical consensus on whether the unborn was life worthy or deserving of protection, the Roe opinion was selective in its historical presentation. The Grand Chamber longer be viewed as legitimate, the evidence that the practice occurred should not be used to support the Court's assumption of their role as moral arbiter where one is not needed, thus imposing a "right" to abortion upon Ireland.
Ancient Near Eastern cultures commonly practiced child sacrifice. For example, the Phoenician mothers placed babies, in the outstretched arms of the Baal idol above a fire where the babies were consumed by the flames as a sacrifice. The Canaanites sacrificed their children in fires to their god 127 Molech. Ancient Egyptians killed their children, "disemboweling and 128 dismembering them shortly after birth-their collagen was ritually harvested for the manufacture of cosmetic creams." Some Polynesian cultures beat 129 pregnant women's abdomens with large stones or heaped hot coals upon them. In these cultures, abortion or infanticide was not only allowed, but in 130 some cases it was required or government mandated. It would be assumed that those who identify themselves as pro-choice would be hostile to any such government mandated abortions or judicial credence given to the ancient cultures permitting abortions as grounds for creating an international right to abortion.
While early western liberal tradition, founded in the Enlightenment period, highly regarded the ancient Greek society, the Classical world fails to provide a strong modern day argument for the creation of an international legalization of abortion. Indeed, "[t]he murder of new-born infants was a practice allowed in almost all of the states of Greece." It can also fairly be 131 alleged that the majority of the ancient Greeks permitted and promoted abortions. Plato himself sometimes permitted abortion, and indeed in his ideal society it would be required for women over the age of forty, although he recognized that the fetus was indeed a human being. The intellectual origins 132 of the Chinese "one child policy" as a zero-population growth policy to avoid overcrowding can be found in Aristotle's Politics where he "required abortion before 'quickening,' whenever the number of state-permitted births became exceeded." The Classical support for abortion was decidedly in opposition 133 to the contemporary American notions of "privacy" as a space outside of governmental regulation. Both Aristotle and Plato espoused the philosophy that "the state's ideals and needs take precedence over the life and rights of the unborn" or infants and as such, the state could rightly determine the appropriate time to abort the life of the unborn. Plato and Aristotle's 134 subsequent disregard of the lives of the unborn comes from their utilitarian belief of a human's purpose. In their eyes, each individual existed solely for the state, absolute rights did not exist, and even the right to life would be sacrificed if the best interests of the state demanded it. In general, most 135 Europeans, even if they deny the unborn child's right to life, are solidly in favor of the absoluteness of their own right to life and thus would be disingenuous in relying on Plato or Aristotle's permission of abortion for support of the creation of a right to abortion. Certainly the Grand Chamber of the ECHR could not rely on the ancient custom to strike down Ireland's statute without simultaneously eliminating A, B, and C's individual right to life under Article 2.
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The oft admired Pagan Roman Empire was no more sympathetic toward the unborn and even infants. Abortion was not usually regarded as being contrary to "Roman Moral Law" in Ancient Pagan Rome. The earliest 136 Roman law code, the Twelve Tables, allowed a father to abandon to the elements any female infant or a deformed infant of either sex. Seneca, 137 writing before 65 A.D., defended the drowning of deformed babies. In the 138 Roman Republic, the father known as the Partria had the power of life and death over all inside his household, men, women, and children therefore any prohibitions against abortion derived from a view of it as an offense against the potential father. Surely A, B, and C could not allege a violation of their 139 human rights with the above theory. Whiston trans., 1856) ("And since Herod had now the government of all Judea put into his hands, he promoted such of the private men of the city as had been of his party, but never left off avenging and punishing everyday those that had chosen to be of the party of his enemies.").
148 What of the great Roman Empire? Motives for abortion varied during the Roman age, but many are shared by our own age. Some of the rich did not want to share their wealth with illegitimate children. Beautiful women 140 practiced abortion to preserve their sex-appeal. The Roman poor felt unable 141 to support many children. There is even a record of a woman aborting a 142 baby after a divorce so she would not be reminded of the man she hated. Herod the Idumaean ordered the deaths of all male children under the age of two in Bethlehem in an attempt to eliminate a perceived threat to his throne.
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Even as the Empire became more pro family under Octavian or Caesar Augustus, abortion was not forbidden because Roman law had borrowed from the Greek Stoics' view that the unborn was not human. Consequently 148 following such a view, the laws against abortion which were in existence seem to have been mostly directed at punishing a woman for depriving her husband of children and for curbing a bad example of negating the maternal instinct.
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The Roman view of a human's purpose was similar to that of Plato and Aristotle, as one historian observes that, "even when born, the child was valued primarily not for itself but for its usefulness to the father, the family, and especially the state, as a citizen 'born for the state.'" Laws remained lax 150 against abortion until Constantine and the advent of the Christian Roman Empire.
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151. See, e.g., IR. CONST., 1937, pmbl. ("In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred, We, the people of Éire, Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial, Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the rightful independence of our Nation, And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our country restored, and concord established with other nations, Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution."). When considering the downright cruelty shown towards the unborn and infants in the Ancient world, one inescapable difference remains. Ireland, England, America, and most of the region addressed by the European Convention of Human Rights, as we understand the countries today, were not founded on Assyrian, Canaanite, or the utilitarian Greek and Roman worldviews but on Western, unmistakably Judeo-Christian, and Enlightenment premises. Men did not exist solely for the state; rather the state existed for 151 men. The Declaration of Independence declared that man possesses absolute "unalienable" rights, the Bill of Rights plainly delineated some of them and, as in the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to life was one of the first mentioned. Hopefully, one would be laughed out of court if he or 152 she attempted to legitimize a challenge to a statute forbidding infanticide on the grounds that the ancient Canaanite practice of burning their firstborn meant that the Council of Europe should not have a ban on the practice. One might assume that if the judges were going to base their decision on historical custom they should place more weight on the historical view that the Jews, Christians, Constantine's Roman Empire, and English Common Law recorder William Blackstone have taken on the importance and sanctity of human life.
Contrary to Justice Blackmun's presentation of the history in Roe, the judiciary was not always so disinclined or confused on how to define personhood. As early as 1795, an English court interpreted the ordinary meaning of the word 'children' in a will, to include a child still in the womb. Consistently, the court continued to declare, as in Thelluson v. authorities have long recognized that a child was in existence from the moment of conception"-in existence as an individual human being distinct from his or her mother, "and not merely a part of its mother's body" until some unspecified time after conception."
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As Justice Bok alluded to the medical field also provided historical grounds for opposing the legalization of abortion. The original Hippocratic Oath required doctors to swear: "I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion." It was not until the early nineteen-sixties that the 165 Hippocratic Oath underwent a revision which removed the clause about abortion.
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At the time Roe was decided States had begun individually addressing and experimenting with various strengths of abortions statues. Change was occurring slowly. The benefits of federalism were being achieved by using the states as microcosms in which to experiment with varying approaches to the law. This is an opportunity that the Council of Europe Member States could still reap the benefit from and one which is compatible with the ECHR's margin of appreciation doctrine. Most of the states allow abortions in these different approaches to be tried and tweaked will result in a better grasp on which policies are successful, and as the national governments understandably have more control over their own laws, they would prefer to be allowed the freedom to experiment.
B. International Conventions/Treaties
The next place to search for binding international law is in treaties or conventions. When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) are examined, one of the things they have in common is that none have been interpreted to encompass a right to abortion. Indeed, language in a few of the above documents could be interpreted to hold that the unborn are protected. Even attorneys for the Center for Reproductive Rights arguing 169 vigorously that access to abortion is a human right, admit that the right cannot be found in binding treaty law with a single regional exception. 170 The first rule of treaty interpretation is found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states, "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." The word 171 abortion cannot be found in any global United Nation's treaty. Nor can a 172 right to abortion be inferred from the ordinary meaning given to any global United Nation's treaty in light of the treaties object and purpose. For example, when looking at the context around the drafting of such documents as the UDHR, ICCPR, CEDAW, and the UNCRC, one notices that many of the drafting and signatory countries had laws forbidding abortion. There is no indication that the countries intended to alter their domestic laws on the subject by ratifying the above treaties, as they have for the most part kept their laws protecting unborn life or criminalizing abortion unaffected. Besides the context, when reading the plain language of the treaties, it is often easier to reconcile the language of the documents with protections for the unborn than the creation of a right to abortion. As an illustration, the UNCRC, which has been ratified by every country but the United States and Somalia, defines a child in Article 1 as "every human being below the age of eighteen." This 173 importantly declares nothing about the minimum age of the child, simply defining the maximum age. Article 6 guarantees all children under the UNCRC "the inherent right to life" and impose on States a responsibility to ensure "the survival and development of the child." Although a preamble 174 is not binding law, the Vienna Convention allows preambles to constitute part of the context in determining the meaning of provisions, and the preamble to the UNCRC recognizes a child as needing legal protection, "before as well as after birth."
175
Abortion advocates have attempted, without success, to get a right to abortion incorporated to some of the above mentioned treaties. Specifically there was debate about the issue at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and at the 1995 World Conference on Women. The effort failed, and neither the Cairo Programme of Action nor the Beijing Platform of Action of 1995 produced from those conferences contains a right to abortion. These documents are not binding in international law, but it is telling that the strongest statement pro-choice advocates were able to wrangle from the conferences was that "where abortion is not against the law, such abortion should be safe." The Cairo Programme of Action and the 176 Beijing Platform of Action also lend credence to the margin of appreciation of the ECHR when they state, "any measures or changes related to abortion within the health system can only be determined at the national or local level according to the national legislative process. Mary Ann Glendon, the 177 Learned Hand Professor of Law at Harvard, found it striking that the Programme of Action rather than treating abortion as a right, asked governments to seek to "reduce the recourse to abortion," "eliminate the need for abortion" and strive to "avoid repeat abortions." In contrast to this 178 treatment of abortion she observes, "[o]ne would hardly say of an important right like free speech, for example, that governments should reduce it, eliminate the need for it, and help avoid its repetition." The ECHR would 179 have to fashion the right out of whole cloth. The Treaty of Lisbon addresses the European Union and not the Council of Europe and as such, has no legal force in limiting the ECHR's jurisdiction over Ireland on the abortion issue. However, it still illustrates the value that Ireland places on unborn life. It would seem ironic if a treaty Ireland signed 51 years ago, never expecting it to create a limitation on a fundamental human right, would now tell Ireland it must obey by the Grand Chamber's ruling and use Ireland to create precedent for an international right to abortion, when Ireland has so clearly made its views on the subject known with its reservation to the Treaty of Lisbon. This would seem to be an area where the ECHR could conclude that Ireland's constitutional amendment reflects the principle that Ireland has chosen to extend a higher level of protection of human rights in its national legislation than is required to by the European Convention on Human Rights and thus the ECHR should give Ireland's policy determination deference according to the margin of appreciation doctrine. 186 
IV. IRELAND'S PERSONAL HISTORIC COMMITMENT
V. PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO ACCEPTING THE CASE
Notwithstanding all the ways the case fails on the merits, procedurally speaking it never should have ended up before the ECHR. The European Convention on Human Rights clearly specifies that applicants should look first to their own domestic courts for remedies before applying to the ECHR. The admissibility criteria for cases are set forth in Article 35 of the Convention. 187 This is not the first time the Court has been faced with examining Ireland's constitutional amendment protecting unborn life. In a 2006 admissibility decision, the ECHR held that the most important way to assert and vindicate constitutional rights would be in the Irish judicial system.
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They have made similar decisions in other cases alleging similar violations of Irish constitutional rights. Essentially, the applicants must have exhausted 191 their domestic remedies to the Court's satisfaction before the Grand Chamber will look any further into the substantive portion of the case.
Applicants should not be confused on what would qualify as an exhaustion of domestic remedies in the Irish Court system. In denying the application for D. v. Ireland, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that "a declaratory action before the Member State's High Court, with a possibility of an appeal to the Supreme Court, constitutes the most appropriate method under Irish Law of seeking" relief. 192 The Irish court has looked at cases which attempt to appropriately balance the right of the unborn child to life with the right of the mother to her own bodily integrity. The Irish courts have repeatedly held that no single 193 interpretation of the constitution is meant to be final for all time, and therefore A, B, and C's chances of succeeding on their claim would not be precluded by prior precedent. Indeed, in the Att'y Gen. v. X case where the Irish court was 194 
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UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:389 the people gave themselves the Constitution to promote the common good, with due observance of prudence, justice and charity so that the dignity and freedom of the individual might be assured. The judges must, therefore, as best they can from their training and their experience interpret these rights in accordance with their ideas of prudence, justice and charity. It is but natural that from time to time the prevailing ideas of these virtues may be conditioned by the passage of time; no interpretation of the Constitution is intended to be final for all time. It is given in the light of prevailing ideas and concepts" (quoting McGee v. Att'y Gen., [1971] 3.3 to allow abortion in certain limited Constitutionally defined circumstances); The interdepartmental Working Group Green Paper on Abortion from September 1999 was submitted by the government to a committee on the Constitution which proposed possible options for the resolution of the dissatisfaction of both prolife and prochoice factions within Ireland. Id. § 6. In 2000, a Fifth progress report was released which agreed to create an agency that would help to provide contraceptive services, offer services which would decrease the presented with a fourteen-year-old rape victim, the justice noted that using those type of interpreting principles were "peculiarly appropriate and illuminating in the interpretation of a sub-section of the constitution which deals with the intimate human problem of the right of the unborn to life and its relationship to the right of the mother of an unborn child to her life." 195 However, A, B, and C did not submit their cases individually or collectively to any court in the Irish legal system. They did not give the Irish judicial system the chance to offer an adequate resolution of the issues. They also did not create a record for the ECHR to review.
Of course the European Convention also provides protections for citizens who can show exceptional circumstances that would justify the immediate filing of an application directly to the ECHR. The burden for using this procedural absolution has historically been very high. A, B, and C allege that they would not be successful in a domestic remedy even with the ability to protect their identities with in camera proceedings. Again, the Court has 196 continually held "that legal advice as to the possibility of success before national courts does not constitute a valid excuse for not exhausting a particular remedy." Taking the Statement of Facts in the case seriously, it 197 is also clear that the tension between the women's rights and the unborn's rights are being examined and dealt with on a fairly regularly basis internally in Ireland. This constant reexamination by the courts, legislatures, and 198 indeed by the people through proposed referendums to the constitution presents the applicants plenty of domestic options to vindicate their claimed rights and to persuade Ireland to consider their opinions.
In deeming the application admissible and holding a hearing in A., B. and C. v. Ireland, the Court has taken a step towards allowing the marginalization of all of its Member States domestic courts. This lowering of the standard typically applied to Article 35 should cause Member States of the Council of Europe to consider how dearly they hold onto their domestic sovereignty.
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For indeed, such a blow to the relevance of each State's respective domestic legal system is an attack, or at least diminution, of one of the founding principles of International Law: domestic sovereignty. Ireland's definition of life expands protection for those genetically human. As this is an expansion in keeping with the move toward universal
